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1 IntroductionStephen F. Szabo, Executive Director
The Russian challenge to the West has been the topic of the 2015-16 fellowship year at the Transatlantic Academy; this report is the result of the work of the Academy fellows over the past eight months. This study follows upon the previous fellowship years, which 
were devoted to examining challenges to the liberal order both at home in North America 
and Europe and in the emerging, less-Western world. Russia was already a consideration 
in the previous fellowship year, which dealt with the role of religion in foreign policy and 
covered President Vladimir Putin’s instrumentalization of civilizational conflict through the 
use of traditional values and the Russian Orthodox Church. The Academy believed a closer 
look at the broader challenge posed by Putin’s Russia was needed following its annexation of 
Crimea and actions in Ukraine. These actions, combined with an increasingly aggressive set 
of measures to influence public opinion and politics within the West, pose a real threat to the 
values of an open society and to the European order. 
Given the mission of the Academy to bring together academics and policymakers from both 
sides of the Atlantic, we took as our focus the transatlantic dimension to this broad challenge. 
While many studies have been done of various aspects of the nature of Putin’s policies and 
the possible dangers they may pose, few have taken the perspective of the Western alliance as 
a whole. Too often, the focus in the United States has been on what U.S. policy and strategy 
should be, with little regard for European perspectives and contributions. This frequently has 
led to a tired debate over the lack of burden sharing by European allies and an ill-informed 
view of what Europe has been doing in response to the damage done to the Western security 
order. On the European side, there has been a general impression that the United States either 
has done too little and is disengaging from Europe as part of a Pacific pivot, or that it is too 
eager to use the crisis to create a new confrontation with Russia. 
As a number of the papers that are highlighted in the report point out, the Western response 
to Russian aggression has in fact been robust and effective, and Western unity has been critical 
to limiting the damage created by this incursion. There has been a transatlantic division of 
labor between a geo-economic Europe with its much larger economic and energy stake in its 
relationship with Russia, and a United States that has used the weight of its military power 
to reassure its European allies and to bolster deterrence. Europeans are indeed more directly 
threatened by Russian military actions in Ukraine and the Baltic States, but have also paid a 
much heavier economic price for sanctions than have Americans. The United States also has a 
vital stake in the stability of the European security system and broader liberal order. This has 
been a case, at least so far, of equitable burden-sharing and partners in leadership.
The Transatlantic Academy fellows came together in September 2015 and were in residence at 
the Academy in Washington, DC until June 2016. They were joined by a number of shorter-
term fellows, who brought perspectives from think tanks and government. They engaged in a 
number of workshops and a joint study trip to Europe and held weekly jour fixes to develop 
both their individual papers and a collaborative memo included in this volume titled “Russia: 
A Test for Transatlantic Unity,” which offers some policy ideas for the incoming U.S. adminis-
tration and for key leaders in Europe. During their year in residence, Russia became directly 
engaged in the war in Syria, confronted NATO ally Turkey, and took intimidating actions in 
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the Baltics. The West struggled to promote a fulfillment of the Minsk agreement, maintained 
a sanctions regime, and took steps to reassure NATO members in Eastern Europe. Academy 
fellows traveled to Berlin, Brussels, London, Rome, Kyiv, Moscow, Warsaw, Philadelphia, 
Austin, and other cities and organized workshops on Russian military modernization and 
hybrid warfare, the evolving Russian relationship with China, the Russian-Turkish relation-
ship, and the state of Russian elites and decision-making, among other topics. 
What follows are the collaborative memo written by the six full-time fellows and short 
summaries of the longer individually written papers. The full texts of the individual papers 
are accessible via hyperlink for published papers; several are still forthcoming in the next two 
months at the time of publication.
The group memo, “Russia: A Test for Transatlantic Unity,” is the product of intensive discus-
sions among the six full-time fellows and offers a number of lessons and policy recommenda-
tions for Western policymakers. They consciously set a short-term (two- to four-year) time 
frame, which is the one of greatest relevance to policymakers. A new U.S. administration will 
take office in January 2017, with crucial elections in France and Germany following later that 
year. Sanctions will be up for a number of renewals over that period, and the Western soli-
darity that has been a success story to this point will be tested. The Minsk agreement will still 
need to be fulfilled and the political stability of Ukraine will hang in the balance. The West 
now has a stake in Ukraine that it did not have before Russia’s intervention and will have to 
maintain its strategic focus in the face of “Ukraine fatigue.”
For the individual research summaries, we open with three papers dealing with the nature 
of the Russian military and hybrid warfare challenge. Marek Menkiszak, the OSW Visiting 
Fellow for the fall term, looks closely at the war in Ukraine and how it fits into Moscow’s long-
term strategy. Margarete Klein, Bosch Public Policy Fellow, writes on the extent of Russian 
military modernization, its achievements and deficiencies, and the implications for NATO 
and the military balance in the region and beyond. Stefan Meister, a visiting fellow with the 
Academy, examines the role of Russian propaganda and Moscow’s disinformation campaign in 
Europe, arguing that while it may be a sign of Russian weakness, it needs to be taken seriously 
and countered within the West. 
Continuing on the topic of Russian policy, Angela Stent offers an assessment of Russia’s turn 
toward China, arguing that it is a pragmatic and tactical move rather than a precursor to a 
closer alliance. China provides some cover to Russia in the wake of Western sanctions but has 
a far greater economic stake in Europe and the United States than it does in Russia. 
The next four essays look at parts of the West itself and its reactions to Russian actions. 
Ulrich Speck provides a case study of how Europe and the North America worked together 
to contain the impact of Russian aggression in Ukraine. He labels it a surprising success story 
that limited the damage but has not resolved the conflict. Led by Chancellor Angela Merkel of 
Germany, the transatlantic community unified on a tough sanctions regime and sent a strong 
message to Moscow of resolve and the importance of maintaining core international norms, 
especially territorial integrity. He poses the larger question of whether this legacy of coop-
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eration will carry over more broadly into successful transatlantic cooperation in the future. 
Andrew Moravcsik’s essay on the lessons from the Ukraine crisis concurs with Speck’s assess-
ment that the West has been surprisingly successful in blocking further Russian assertiveness 
and points to the primacy of geo-economics and non-military policy instruments in this 
response. This was a case where Europe led, with the United States playing a supporting role. 
Moravcsik contends that this approach should serve as a paradigm for future Western strate-
gies. Moravcsik also warns of the perils of changing course from this successful approach. 
Hannes Adomeit, another Bosch Fellow, raises questions about the long-term durability of this 
approach in Germany, noting a “changed atmosphere” since the fall of 2015 with the influx 
of refugees into Germany and other developments and citing the government’s controver-
sial agreement to the construction of a second Nord Stream gas pipeline with Russia. While 
Germany has taken in the lead in crafting the Western response to Russia’s aggression in 
Ukraine, its leaders and public are deeply divided on where to go from here. Nelli Babayan, in 
her analysis of the countries between Russia and the EU and foreign policies toward them, sees 
illiberalism as the winner, with authoritarian leaders deftly playing off the West against Russia. 
She argues for a clear and consistent Western approach toward Eastern Partnership countries 
that emphasizes conditionality, engagement in dealing with frozen conflicts, and the strength-
ening of border controls.
The two final essays by Chris Miller and Marie Mendras point out some key vulnerabilities 
in the Russian system. Miller points to major changes in European energy markets that have 
substantially reduced Russia’s dominance and the long-term impact of Russia’s repeated use of 
non-energy trade policy as a political weapon. The deterioration of Russia’s economic leverage 
has important implications for its role in the Eastern Partnership countries and beyond. 
Mendras examines the impact of the Ukraine crisis and Putin’s confrontational policy on 
Russian elites, arguing that the president has broken his social contract with influential groups. 
She sees a growing conflict between these elites becoming more acute and raising questions 
about the longer term viability of the Putin system. 
Russia will remain a power to reckon with in Europe and the scope of constructive coopera-
tion will remain very limited. Contacts with Russian civil society must be strengthened to 
the extent that they can be, given the Putin regime’s obstruction of such contacts. Russia 
expertise must be rebuilt in both Europe and North America after a sharp post-Cold War 
decline. Western unity vis-à-vis Russia should be the top priority of leaders in the transatlantic 
community during a time when it will be tested. 
I would like to thank Ted Reinert for his work on the Academy’s publications including 
editing, Jessica Hirsch for all of her excellent support of the Academy’s work, Alexandra 
Martin and Djordje Milosevic for their research assistance, and our partners at GMF who 
assisted on this publication, in particular Rachel Tausendfreund, Christine Chumbler, and 
George Marshall. All of us at the Academy wish to thank our partners, who are listed on this 
report, for their continuing support of our work, without which this transatlantic dialogue 
would not be possible. We would also like to thank those who contributed to our deliberations 
in a variety of workshops and conversations over the past eight months.
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Russia: A Test for Transatlantic Unity
Nelli Babayan, Marie Mendras, Chris Miller,  
Andrew Moravcsik, Ulrich Speck, and Angela Stent
Surprising Solidarity on Ukraine
Since the annexation of Crimea, the transatlantic partners have successfully acted together to contain the Ukraine conflict. The European Union and the United States displayed an unexpected degree of unity and resolve in response to Russia’s military 
actions in Ukraine. These actions have ironically strengthened the perception that Ukraine is a 
vital foreign policy interest for the West.1 
Dealing with Russia in the coming years, the transatlantic partners need to continue building 
on their unity for at least three reasons. First, Russia’s tensions with the West are likely to 
continue over the next couple of years. Second, given its current actions and rhetoric, Russia 
is likely to continue to pressure its neighbors in order to discourage them from exercising 
sovereign choices over domestic and foreign policy. Third, the Kremlin will continue to try to 
undermine transatlantic unity on issues such as sanctions. 
Yet, Russia’s attempts will not succeed if the West stays on the course it has recently adopted: 
unified transatlantic action, continuous support for good governance in countries such as 
Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, and close coordination between European capitals, EU insti-
tutions, and Washington.
The Russia Challenge
The main Russian challenge to the transatlantic community is the Kremlin’s resort to force 
against its neighbors and the resultant threat to European security.
Ambitions
• Russia seeks Western acceptance of its claim to predominance in the post-Soviet space. In 
practice, this means limited sovereignty for Russia’s neighbors and Russian veto power over 
their right to choose whether to align with the European Union or NATO.
• Russia seeks an end to what it perceives as Western strategy to promote “color revolutions” 
and regime change.
• Russia seeks to establish itself as a counter-model to what it depicts the “decadent” West. 
Moscow disputes the concept of universal values.
• Russia seeks to increase its influence in Europe and the United States by eroding unity on 
Ukraine, weakening the European Union’s ability to act effectively, and undermining trans-
atlantic security cooperation.
Today, Russia poses a heightened security challenge to Europe, with provocative military 
activity directed at members and partners of NATO. 
Capabilities
Despite the scope of its foreign policy ambitions, Russia’s capabilities are limited, given an 
undiversified and contracting economy, demographic decline, corruption, failure to build the 
1 We define the West in this memo as the European Union and its member states plus the United States, Canada, Japan, and other 
European NATO members. 
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Figure 1: Russian GDP Growth
Source: Rossstat
Figure 2: International Oil Price (US$ per barrel Brent crude)
Source: Bloomberg
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institutions of modern governance, brain drain, crumbling infrastructure, and lack of interna-
tional friends and allies. 
Nevertheless, Russia’s size, unity of decision-making, nuclear arsenal, modernized armed 
forces, permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, abundant natural resources, 
and cyber capabilities enable it to project power and exercise influence beyond what its limita-
tions would suggest. 
• Russia’s armed forces have improved since the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, and a military 
modernization program is underway. Although Russia’s military remains far inferior to 
that of NATO, it remains the predominant military power in the post-Soviet space and can 
project power in its neighborhood. Russia is also one of the top three most cyber-capable 
states, giving it the capacity to launch distributed denial-of-service attacks, jam communi-
cations, and attack critical infrastructure and defense systems. 
• Russia remains a nuclear superpower and increasingly relies on the threat that it could use 
its nuclear forces to project power. Russian officials increasingly talk about the possibility of 
limited nuclear war — a potent tool of intimidation. 
• Russia is a leading global producer of oil and gas. While falling oil prices, the shale revolution, 
and alternative energy sources have diminished its ability to use energy to dictate the terms of 
trade, it nevertheless retains leverage over parts of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and the 
EU overall will continue to import 30 percent of its gas supplies from Russia. 
Figure 3: Russian Ruble - U .S . Dollar Exchange Rate
Source: Bloomberg
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• Russia uses state-controlled media to promote its narrative and confuse reporting about 
its actions abroad. Russia continues to exploit business, intelligence, and other networks, 
which often date back to the Soviet era but have adapted to modernity, as tools of influence 
in Europe and Eurasia.
Russia’s ability to act as a spoiler, including its U.N. veto power, forces the West to engage with 
it on global issues. Even though Russia’s capabilities are circumscribed, its capacity to destabi-
lize its neighborhood and beyond should not be underestimated. 
Western Interests
The Transatlantic Community has four major interests with regard to Russia. Western coun-
tries generally would like to see a Russia that:
1. Respects the state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and foreign policy choices of its neigh-
bors in the post-Soviet space, and does not use military means to threaten its neighbors.
2. Behaves as a constructive partner on other regional and global issues, such as the situa-
tion in Syria and Libya, non-proliferation, and international institutions and lives up to its 
agreements in regard to the European security order. 
3. Reliably supplies energy to and trades with Europe in a transparent and open market 
manner.
4. Is well-governed, pluralistic, economically open, and respectful of human rights. 
The greatest immediate concern for the West and greatest source of potential conflict with 
Russia has been Moscow’s policies toward its neighbors. Countries should be free to choose 
their own international and domestic policies, including pursuing European integration. 
Over the past two decades, U.S. and European policies to encourage the modernization of the 
Russian economy and polity have failed. The United States and most European governments 
have concluded that they can do little to influence the evolution of Russian domestic affairs.
While Western countries have common major interests with regard to Russia, that nation is a 
unified actor and the West is a diverse collection of democratic countries, with different geog-
raphies, economic interests, strategic cultures, and historical experiences with Russia, which 
limits its capability to act in a unified manner. 
Contested Issues
Over the near term, the most contested issues between Russia and the West are likely to be 
Ukraine and the EU’s eastern neighborhood, the Syrian war, and economic and energy rela-
tions. 
Ukraine and the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood 
Over the next two years, this region is likely to be the focus of continuing conflict. Russia has 
spent the past decade undermining efforts in the region to reform domestically and integrate 
with the West. 
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Though Russia’s military push into Ukraine has come to a halt, the Kremlin remains 
committed to subverting Kyiv’s post-Maidan government. Beyond the annexation of Crimea 
and the war in Donbas, Russia deploys a wide variety of tools against Ukraine, including cyber 
attacks, trade sanctions, diversion of energy flows, disinformation, long-standing relations 
with corrupt oligarchs, and refusal to restructure debt. Economic and other non-military 
levers against Ukraine have the potential advantage to Russia of being less likely to trigger an 
immediate Western response. 
The European Union and the United States aim to stabilize Ukraine and the other countries 
in the EU’s eastern neighborhood. This requires economic and technical assistance. Further 
political upheaval in the neighborhood beyond Ukraine is likely, potentially sharpening 
existing disagreements between Russia and the West. Both domestic politics and frozen 
conflicts could explode into new clashes. 
Syria
Russia has supported Bashar al-Assad since the beginning of the Syrian war with arms deliv-
eries, financial aid, and diplomatic support at the United Nations Security Council. When it 
became apparent that the Assad regime might collapse, Russia launched sustained airstrikes 
Figure 4: EU Member States’ Gas Dependency on Russia (2014)
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and deployed ground troops in September 2015. Russia and the West have pursued signifi-
cantly different goals in Syria. 
Western goals in Syria are to achieve a cessation of hostilities, humanitarian relief, diminished 
refugee flows, the defeat of the self-proclaimed Islamic State and other terrorist groups, and 
replacement of the Assad regime with one that represents the broad interests of the Syrian 
population. For Europe, the refugee crisis has become a major issue. However, Western actions 
toward reaching these goals have been limited, with the U.S. government and others wary of 
being drawn into an intractable conflict.
Russia’s main goal is to keep the Assad regime in power, though it has intervened militarily in 
the Syrian war under the guise of fighting terror. The Russians have made clear that they deem 
all anti-Assad groups, some of whom the United States and its coalition partners support, to be 
terrorists. If Assad is eventually eased out, then Russia wants to have a say in who his successor 
will be, so as to protect Russia’s political and military assets in Syria, including its naval base at 
Tartus and its air base at Latakia. Russia’s campaign also helps it reestablish a presence in the 
wider Middle East, regaining regional influence it lost after the Soviet collapse.
Russian actions have exacerbated the migrant crisis, destabilizing the European Union and its 
member state governments. 
Energy and Economics
Russia and the West continue to disagree over sanctions and the rules governing energy 
markets. EU economic and financial sanctions linked to the fulfillment of the Minsk II agree-
ment are up for renewal in July 2016.2 Energy links continue as Europe needs Russian natural 
gas and Russia needs hydrocarbon revenues. Yet a European gas market that is fragmented and 
opaque lets Russia extract higher prices for its gas exports and use energy for political gain. 
Western sanctions against Russia are likely to be maintained in the near future. Russia will not 
relinquish Crimea, and the West’s Crimea sanctions will remain in place. Russia has an interest 
in the removal of economic and financial sanctions linked to its military presence in eastern 
Ukraine though the link to Minsk conditions makes this difficult. 
The Kremlin will continue to use energy to promote its political and economic goals, though 
its leverage has diminished in most countries. There are two main reasons why: a huge supply 
glut that has driven prices down and increased EU attempts to promote competition in Euro-
pean gas markets. The EU’s efforts to create an Energy Union have made great progress in 
recent years. 
2 On February 12, 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President François Hollande, 
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, and OSCE Special Representative Heidi Tagliavini took part in talks in Minsk and agreed on 
a “Set of Measures to Implement the Minsk Agreements.” These included a ceasefire starting on February 15; withdrawal of heavy 
weapons beginning on February 17 and completed within two weeks; the release of all prisoners, with amnesties for those involved in 
the fighting; the withdrawal of all foreign-armed formations, weapons, and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory, as well as disarma-
ment of all illegal groups; and constitutional reform to enable the decentralization of the rebel regions by the end of 2015 and the 
restoration of Ukrainian border controls with Russia, to be completed by the end of 2015. Like the failed Minsk Protocol of September 
5, 2014, “Minsk II” was signed by the trilateral contact group comprising representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE, and 
by the representatives of the two rebel regions in eastern Donbas. The document can be read in Russian at http://www.osce.org/
cio/140156 and in English at http://www.cfr.org/ukraine/package-measures-implementation-minsk-agreements/p36118.
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What is To Be Done?
The main challenge for the United States and Europe over the next couple of years is to main-
tain their successful cooperation and present a united front when dealing with Russia over 
the Ukraine crisis. That means maintaining the sanctions regime unless there is serious and 
demonstrable progress in implementing the Minsk agreement. This may become increasingly 
difficult for several reasons:
• Pressure from some EU member states to begin to ease sanctions, given different strategic 
concepts toward Russia that favor accommodation and business and economic interests 
that favor trade and investment. Elections and referenda in several major European coun-
tries could also change the political calculus on Russia. 
• A United States focused on a contentious presidential campaign where several popular 
candidates have engaged in isolationist rhetoric, telegraphing uncertainty about the foreign 
policy of the next administration. 
• Growing “Ukraine fatigue” due to political infighting and slow progress on reforms in Kyiv. 
A lack of willingness by governments and international organizations to spend money and 
other resources on Ukraine given competing priorities. 
While EU sanctions are likely to remain in place until the end of 2016, it is possible that EU 
unity will not hold beyond December, especially if Europe is forced to confront new regional 
crises or faces intensified internal disagreements. It is also possible that certain Western coun-
tries may begin to loosen sanctions enforcement.
If Brussels does begin to relax sanctions and Washington does not, Russia’s preferred option 
— dealing with individual states bilaterally — may once again become the norm. In the same 
time frame, the outcome of the U.S. 2016 presidential election could have a major impact on 
U.S. policy toward Europe and Russia in ways that could affect the alliance’s ability to coop-
erate on Russia policy going forward. A Donald Trump victory could lead to a U.S. rapproche-
ment with Russia and call into question the future of the transatlantic alliance. 
Russia’s domestic trajectory and the sustainability of its economic and political system is an 
additional uncertainty. The alliance must be prepared to deal with unexpected developments 
in Russia.
Despite a range of economic and political stresses facing Europe and the United States, those 
nations have so far responded successfully to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Moving forward, we 
recommend Western governments: 
• Maintain Western unity: Carry on with the present transatlantic strategy including burden 
sharing with the Europeans paying a higher price for sanctions and the Americans offering 
more military reassurance to allies. 
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• Continue to insist on Minsk implementation: Maintain linkage between sanctions on 
Russia and the fulfilment of the Minsk process, endorsed by the European Council and U.S. 
government statements, with Ukrainian control of state borders being the key criterion.3 
• Continue the sanctions regime: Maintain contingency plans to toughen sanctions in order 
to discourage Russia from further offensive military action, and communicate this clearly 
to the Russia leadership. 
• Maintain Crimea sanctions until the status of the peninsula is resolved under interna-
tional law.
• Consider Ukraine a long-term investment in European stability: Western governments 
should continue to prioritize supporting the Ukrainian government’s program of economic 
restructuring and political and legal reforms. Europe cannot be isolated from Ukraine’s 
challenges, as the events of the past several years show. 
• Work with the countries of the EU’s eastern neighborhood to develop their security 
and border control capabilities: Russian intervention is most effective in instances where 
governments lack effective security mechanisms. 
• Continue diplomatic engagement with Russia to deal with the Syrian war: The United 
States must maintain its talks with Russia to prevent unanticipated military incidents, and 
the transatlantic partners must work with Russia to bring the warring parties to the negoti-
ating table. There should be a compartmentalization of Western policy toward Russia in the 
Syrian and Ukrainian theaters. 
• Do not engage with Russia for the sake of engagement: A new dialogue should only 
begin when there are concrete and constructive proposals on the table.
• Invest in training the next generation of Russia experts: Since the Soviet collapse, the 
United States and European countries (Poland, Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic States 
excepted) have sharply curtailed support for Russian studies. In 2014, the U.S. Department 
of Education cut funding for university Russia/Eurasia studies programs by 40 percent. 
Western governments should recommit to investing in the next generation of Russia/
Eurasia experts so that their countries are better equipped to deal with Russia. A German 
institute for the study of Russia and Eastern Europe being set up by the Federal Foreign 
Office to replace one closed in 2000 is a start.4 
• Keep engaging Russian civil society: Western governments and societies should maintain 
and intensify contacts through educational, professional, and other exchanges.
3 European Council, “Conclusions – 19 and 20 March 2015,” March 20, 2015, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2015/03/20-conclusions-european-council/; V. Nuland, “Testimony on Ukraine Before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee,” U.S. Department of State, March 10, 2015, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2015/mar/238722.htm. 
4 A. Rinke, “In response to Ukraine crisis, Berlin to launch new think tank,” Reuters, January 27, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-ukraine-crisis-germany-russia-idUSKBN0L028420150127. 
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Western Trade with Russia Contracting
EU and U.S. trade with Russia has dropped precipitously since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis 
due to sanctions, the weakened ruble, lower energy prices, the weakened Russian economy, and 
other factors. EU and U.S. trade with Russia have contracted by comparable degrees, although EU 
trade with Russia is roughly ten times as large as U.S. trade with Russia. Total EU trade in goods 
with Russia in 2015 was worth €210 billion (roughly $231 billion), down from €326.5 billion in 
2013. Total U.S. trade in goods with Russia in 2015 was worth $23.6 billion (roughly €21.5 billion), 
down from $38.2 billion in 2013. U.S. trade with Russia represented 0.6 percent of the total value 
of U.S. trade with the world in 2015; EU trade with Russia represented 6.0 percent of total EU trade 
with non-EU member states 
the same year. 
The Cost of Sanctions
• EU: The European 
Commission reportedly 
estimated the overall 
cost of sanctions on 
Russia and Russian 
counter-sanctions as 
-0.3 percent of EU GDP 
in 2014 and -0.4 percent 
in 2015 (€40 and €50 
billion, respectively).1
• France: Cancelling the 
€1.2 billion contract to 
supply Russia with two 
Mistral amphibious heli-
copter carriers cost Paris 
cost “at least €1 billion,” 
as the government has 
to repay Russia money 
it already received, plus a penalty for breach of contract. The ships were later sold to Egypt for 
€950 million.2
• Finland: Finland’s Ministry of Finance forecast in 2014 that Russian GDP decline would reduce 
Finland’s GDP in 2014–15 by around 0.5 percent relative to its 2013 forecast, which would raise 
the unemployment rate by around 0.2 percentage points by the end of 2015.3
• Germany: Bilateral trade between Germany and Russia has been nearly halved since 2012, with 
German exports to Russia down to €20.2 billion in 2015. In 2015, the number of companies in 
Russia with German capital interest fell by 7 percent, to 5,583, while the number of branch and 
1 M. Szczepański, “ Economic impact on the EU of sanctions over Ukraine conflict,“ European Parliament Research Service, 
October 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/569020/EPRS_BRI(2015)569020_EN.pdf. 
2 Ibid.
3 Ministry of Finance, Finland, “The economic effects of the EU’s Russia sanctions and Russia’s counter sanctions,” September 
2014, http://valtioneuvosto.fi/documents/10184/1058456/venaja_pakotteet_en.pdf/11184e4f-b00a-4474-9576-
66c89d9e18ae.
Figure 5: EU Trade in Goods with Russia (millions of euros)
Sources: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/
russia/; http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tra-
doc_122530.pdf
Transatlantic Academy 201614
representative 
offices of German 
companies in 
Russia shrank by 
nearly 24 percent.4
• United States: 
Sanctions forced oil 
giant ExxonMobil to 
suspend its $700 
million joint venture 
with Rosneft in the 
Kara Sea. Other 
U.S. companies, 
including oilfield 
service company 
Halliburton and 
heavy farm equip-
ment producer John 
Deere, attributed 
lower profits and 
sales to sanctions.5
4 Federal Foreign Office, Germany, “Russian Federation,” March 2016, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/
Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Nodes/RussischeFoederation_node.html.
5 R.M. Nelson, “U.S. Sanctions on Russia: Economic Implications,” Congressional Research Service, February 4, 2015, https://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43895.pdf.
Figure 6: U .S . Trade in Goods with Russia (millions of U .S . dollars)
Sources: https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4621.html; https://www.
census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0015.html
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Additional Recommendations
The authors have diverse opinions on Russia policy but agree on the analysis and recom-
mendations above. Below are some additional non-unanimous suggestions on how the West’s 
conflict with Russia might evolve and what policies European and North American govern-
ments should follow.
Set priorities in Minsk process
The Minsk process as currently interpreted is unlikely to be implemented fully. The West must 
set priorities as it prepares for a negotiated solution. The major Western leaders understand 
Minsk as requiring Russia to undertake the following steps: 1) actually implement the Donbas 
ceasefire; 2) assent to elections in the Donbas, under Ukrainian law, that are free and fair and 
do not simply ratify the control of Russian proxies; and 3) return control of the Russian-Ukrai-
nian border to authorities in Kyiv. Economic sanctions alone are unlikely to compel Russia to 
fulfill all of these steps, especially regarding the border, in the short term.
The West will likely end up compromising on some aspects of Minsk. If so, it should priori-
tize preserving Ukraine’s European orientation, bolstering its domestic stability and limiting 
Russian influence in Kyiv. In particular, the West should avoid agreeing to elections in the 
Donbas or the reintegration of the territory into Ukrainian politics, without first assuring that 
Russia’s forces or its proxies no longer play a major role. 
Chris Miller and Andrew Moravcsik
Stick firmly to the sanctions policy 
The West has set out clear conditions for the removal of the economic sanctions against 
Russia: the “full implementation of the Minsk agreement,” which means the restoration of 
Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as far as eastern Ukraine is concerned. The West 
should stick to this policy, both to remain credible and demonstrate to Russia that the West 
is able to act forcefully if the European peace order is under threat; and to deter Russia from 
resorting to the use of military force in Ukraine again. 
The sanctions regime is presenting Moscow with a clear choice: either respect Ukrainian 
sovereignty in the Donbas or accept economic pain. An offer to renegotiate the sanctions 
package would only support the view in Moscow that Russia can have it both ways: use 
military force to weaken and control Ukraine and maintain good economic relations with the 
West. As a consequence, Russia would double down on its efforts to undermine Western unity 
and to prevent Ukraine from building a decent state and a viable economy.
Ulrich Speck
In the long-term, take prudent steps to strengthen reformers in Ukraine, but in the short- and 
medium-term, expect to face complex trade-offs between promoting reform and achieving 
political and economic stability
Over the long-term, Ukraine’s road to domestic stability, prosperity, and success lies through 
good government and economic reform. The West’s short-term priority, however, is to help 
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Ukraine to remain solvent, stable, and sovereign in the face of internal and external economic 
stress, Russian political and economic pressure, military threats, and unresolved political 
conflicts. While on the margins Western conditionality can help promote reforms, the forces 
of reform are weak in Ukraine and the political and economic survival of elites often depends 
on resisting reform. Comparative experience suggests that in conditions where reformers are 
not powerful and the international security interests of donor countries are engaged, external 
conditionality generally results in formal adoption of programs and measures followed by 
implementation failure in the face of popular discontent and elite opposition. 
It would be self-defeating for the West to abandon Ukraine, or drive it to collapse, in an effort 
to force reform through. Because this “nuclear option” is not credible, Western leaders must 
develop “second-best” policies in the knowledge that conditionality may fail but support for 
Ukraine may still be in their economic and political interest. This may well mean continuing 
to fund Ukraine for some time to come even without satisfactory reform in place.
Andrew Moravcsik 
Strengthen the reformers in Ukraine by giving them a clear EU perspective and  
by sticking to conditionality
The only way toward stability in Ukraine is reform. Only as a well-governed state with func-
tioning institutions will Ukraine be able to satisfy the ambitions of its citizens and be capable 
of fending off Russian attempts to meddle into its internal affairs. Ukraine currently has a 
window of opportunity to reform that must not be wasted. In order to strengthen pro-reform 
forces, EU leaders should send a public signal that the door to the EU is open once Ukraine 
fulfills the criteria for EU membership. Such a signal could serve as a game-changer in the 
internal struggle between oligarchic networks and reformers. The West should also stick to 
strict conditionality: more support only for more reform. Domestic reformers have a weak 
hand; they need the West to push the country to implement reforms.
The goal of Western support is reform: setting in motion a process to make Ukraine self-
sustainable as a state and as an economy. The costs of supporting Ukraine are considerable, 
but tiny as compared to the costs of spill-over effects if Ukraine is further destabilized.
Chris Miller, Ulrich Speck, and Angela Stent 
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Russia’s Long War on Ukraine 
Marek Menkiszak (OSW Visiting Fellow)
Russia’s political leadership has pursued a consistent policy of pushing a reluctant Ukraine into Moscow-led Eurasian economic integration projects that are in fact geopolitical and aimed at establishing Russian strategic control over the post-Soviet 
area. Due to its size, potential, and historical closeness to Russia, Ukraine has been perceived 
as the key country for these projects. 
While the annexation of Crimea was a success for the Kremlin, boosting popular support for 
the Putin regime within Russia, Moscow has failed in achieving its offensive strategic goals 
toward Ukraine. The regime failed to control Ukraine through President Viktor Yanukovych’s 
government, so Moscow moved forward with the Novorossiya project to assume control over 
a large part of Ukraine. Now, facing Ukrainian resistance and economic crisis, Moscow has 
decided to de-escalate the war in Donbas to convince the West to relax sanctions. However, 
Russia has not changed its goal of ultimately bringing Ukraine under its control; it has only 
changed tactics and instruments. The objective remains to derail the process of Ukraine’s 
integration into Europe and reform based on European standards. Russia wants Ukraine to fail 
since a successful transformation would pose a challenge for Moscow by providing an alterna-
tive model of development and integration in Eastern Europe, ultimately undermining the 
legitimacy of the Putin regime. 
We must expect a long strategic game in and over Ukraine. The United States and European 
Union, rather than accommodating Russia, should pursue a three-fold strategy of “smart 
containment”: continuing to pressure the Russian government, including through sanctions, 
while engaging the Russian people; offering targeted support for Ukraine and other Eastern 
neighbors, conditional on key reforms; and increasing Europe’s resilience against nega-
tive Russian influence, including by developing the military capabilities of NATO members 
and non-aligned states. A free, stable, and prosperous Europe cannot be achieved without a 
successful European transformation of Ukraine, paving a road for a possible future transfor-
mation of Russia. For this, transatlantic policy coordination is essential. 
http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/russia%E2%80%99s-long-war-ukraine
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Russia’s Military: On the Rise?  
Margarete Klein (Bosch Fellow) 
After the 2008 war with Georgia, Russia started its most radical and comprehensive mili-tary reform in several decades. Its goal is to transform an outdated mass mobilization army into combat-ready armed forces that are able to pursue a broader set of functions 
— from nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence to conventional warfare in local and regional 
conflicts to non-linear warfare and combating terrorism. The results are mixed. On one hand, 
Russia was successful in streamlining command and control structures, improving training, 
increasing the number of professional soldiers, and strengthening elite forces. Moscow 
consequently enhanced its capability for joint operations, inter-agency coordination, and 
strategic mobility. Russia also made progress in modernizing weapons and equipment. On the 
other hand, structural problems still set limits to Russia’s military development. The defense 
industry is unable to deliver the requested amount and quality of modern weapons in due time 
and to agreed cost. More broadly, Russia faces demographic problems and — most notably — 
insufficient financial means with declining oil prices and the effects of Western sanctions.
Despite these limitations, Russia’s operations in Ukraine and Syria clearly demonstrate that 
its armed forces are able to fulfill an increased set of functions. Particularly in regard to its 
post-Soviet neighbors, Russia can rely on its vast arsenal that, despite stemming from Soviet 
times, can still be used in combat operations. The intervention in Syria shows that Moscow is 
able to quickly deploy troops and hardware beyond the post-Soviet space and pursue limited 
expeditionary warfare based on air power. While Russia still lags behind NATO in quantitative 
and qualitative terms, it has enhanced its military capabilities on its western frontiers and can 
benefit from asymmetric strategies, quick decision-making processes, and strategic surprise. 
NATO should react with a double strategy. The Atlantic Alliance has to improve credible 
military reassurance for its eastern members. In parallel, NATO should promote confidence-
building measures to avoid unintended military confrontation and maintain chances for 
cooperation with Russia in areas where the interests of both sides overlap.
http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/russia%E2%80%99s-military-rise-0
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Isolation and Propaganda: The Roots and Instruments of Russia’s Disinformation Campaign  
Stefan Meister
Western scholars and politicians struggle to understand the elements of Russia’s “hybrid warfare” and how to counter it. Means for “soft,” non-military Russian influence in the post-Soviet sphere and the European Union includes export media 
such as the television broadcaster RT and the media platform Sputnik, the targeted expansion 
of informal financial networks, and funding and support for left- and right-wing populist 
political parties and organizations. A 2013 speech by the chief of the Russian General Staff 
described the new rules of 21st century warfare, in which political goals are to be obtained 
through the “widespread use of disinformation… deployed in connection with the protest 
potential of the population.” It has also cracked down against foreign influence and dissent in 
Russia through restricting the work of Western NGOs and independent media. The Russian 
government claims it is merely copying the instruments and techniques that the West itself 
employs, and deems legitimate, to promote democracy in Russia and the post-Soviet states. 
This information warfare is an approach born out of weakness that provides more flexibility 
against a challenger with much greater economic and technological resources.
The possibilities for directly influencing developments in Russia from outside are limited. 
Europeans, on the other hand, are vulnerable to Russian influence with their open societies, 
and Russian efforts can help fuel self-doubt in increasingly fragile and fragmented Western 
societies. The EU can protect itself by reinforcing its own soft power and improving gover-
nance within Europe, standing firm on sanctions, improving its knowledge base on Russia and 
the other post-Soviet states, and taking steps to improve pluralism in the Russian-language 
media space. It should also come up with a serious offer for its eastern neighbors including 
an EU membership prospect. If reform efforts succeed in Ukraine, the impact could spread 
to Russia and other post-Soviet states. Moscow encourages destabilization, corruption, and 
weak states in order to maintain relationships of dependency. The EU has something much 
more attractive to offer the societies of neighboring countries. It should make greater use of its 
strategic advantage.
http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/isolation-and-propaganda-roots-and- 
instruments-russias-disinformation-campaign
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Russia, China, and the West After Crimea  
Angela Stent
Since the onset of the Ukraine crisis, Vladimir Putin has enthusiastically promoted ties with China as an alternative to Russia’s adversarial relationship with the United States and Europe. Presidents Putin and Xi have lavishly praised each other and criticized 
U.S. “unilateralism.” They have stepped up their military cooperation — conducting joint 
naval exercises in the Mediterranean last year — and signed major energy deals, such as the 
$400 billion Power of Siberia Gas pipeline project. In 2015, they attended each other’s military 
parades commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, when no Western 
leader attended either. The rhetoric and optics stress close ties between two leaders who share 
a conviction that their countries were unfairly treated in the past. They are also uncomfortable 
with the current international political and financial order, which, they believe, denies them 
equal treatment in setting the agenda and determining the institutional rules. 
Despite the intensification of Sino-Russian ties since the annexation of Crimea, however, 
this remains a pragmatic and instrumental partnership, not a prelude to a closer alliance. For 
Moscow, the partnership is designed to reinforce Russia’s role as an independent center of 
global power, one of Putin’s key foreign policy goals. It is also intended to confer success by 
association from a rising China to a Russia experiencing serious economic problems. China’s 
support for Russia has served to legitimize Moscow’s actions in Ukraine and Syria. Russia is a 
useful partner for China because it supplies China with hydrocarbons and advanced military 
hardware, supports China on all major foreign policy issues, and pursues a policy of non-
interference in China’s domestic affairs. While Chinese experts may privately express criticism 
of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, publicly officials have adopted a policy of neutrality. In return, 
Russia has not commented publically on China’s military activities in the South China Sea, 
although these actions have irked Russia’s other Asian partners such as Vietnam.
China protects Russia from the full impact of Western sanctions and gives it continuing 
international legitimacy at a time when the West has sought to isolate it. Beijing has remained 
neutral as Russia has destabilized Ukraine used military force to keep the Assad regime in 
power in Syria. Nevertheless, China is unlikely to take actions that would contravene Western 
sanctions against Russia. Its economic interests in both the United States and Europe are 
significantly greater than are its economic interests in Russia. Ultimately, while the Kremlin 
seeks to overturn the U.S.-led global order and promote a tripolar world order, Beijing prefers 
to reform the existing order to suit its economic and geostrategic interests, and it regards the 
United States as its only true global counterpart.
Link forthcoming
Russia: A Test for Transatlantic Unity 21
The West’s Response to the Ukraine Conflict: A Transatlantic Success Story  
Ulrich Speck
Transatlantic cooperation in dealing with Russian aggression in Ukraine has been a surprising success. European countries and the United States, together with partners such as Canada and Japan, have responded to that challenge with a high degree of unity 
and consistency. This has led to the idea of the West as an international actor, as the central 
pillar of the liberal world order, has experienced a renaissance.
By using surprisingly massive economic and financial sanctions as well as tireless diplomacy, 
the West has helped Ukraine resist Moscow’s aggression. Russia’s advance in Ukraine has been 
stopped in a joint effort by Ukraine and its Western backers. While the conflict remains far 
from being resolved, a process is now underway — based on the Minsk agreement — to at 
least limit the damage, supported by Western powers. 
Furthermore, Europe and the United States have become deeply engaged in trying to help 
Ukraine to stabilize by building the institutions of a modern state. Reform in Ukraine is a 
crucial point of Western involvement in the conflict, as the weakness of the Ukrainian state is 
a key reason for its failure to resist Russian aggression.
At the same time Europe and the United States have sent a strong message to Moscow and 
other capitals — such as Beijing — that the West continues to support core international rules 
such as territorial integrity and sovereignty, and is ready to invest a considerable amount of 
energy in holding up these norms. 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel played a central role in building this coalition and keeping 
it together. Germany has a particularly strong interest in stability in Eastern Europe and 
has moved into an informal leadership position in the EU since the euro crisis. Berlin and 
Washington, alongside Paris and Brussels, were the key Western capitals during the Ukraine 
conflict.
With the joint response to Russian aggression against Ukraine, Europe and the United States 
have set a precedent for a successful transatlantic cooperation on international conflicts. 
Whether this success story can become the starting point for a true renaissance of the West 
will depend on their ability and will to stay the course on Russia and Ukraine in the next 
months and years. More broadly, success will be determined by the willingness of the central 
actors to move from crisis management to long-term joint strategic planning on a broad range 
of international challenges.
http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/west%E2%80%99s-response-ukraine-conflict-
transatlantic-success-story
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Lessons from Ukraine: Why a Europe-Led Geo-Economic Strategy is Succeeding 
Andrew Moravcsik
Over the past three years, the United States, Europe, and other Western allies have been unexpectedly successful at maintaining a unified, coherent, and effective policy to block Russian assertiveness. This is true even though proximity, and the decision by 
Europe and the United States to rule out direct use of military force, would appear to give 
Russia a decisive strategic advantage. While NATO remains an important background condi-
tion for Western success, the United States and Europe have employed primarily non-military 
policy instruments. Most important have been economic assistance to Ukraine, sanctions on 
Russia, diplomatic engagement, and, in the longer term, reductions in Western and Ukrainian 
dependence on the Russian economy. While U.S. involvement has been important, from the 
beginning Europe has shouldered the primary burden. 
The West can sustain this success by heeding three policy lessons drawn from it. 
First, the major Russian threats in the region are economic and political, not military. The 
possibility that Putin will launch a military strike at the rest of Ukraine, Latvia, or Poland 
remains remote compared to the far greater danger that pro-Western political and economic 
policies in Ukraine and other neighboring countries will collapse of their own accord, aided by 
Russian political and economic pressure. 
Second, Western policy should continue to rely on non-military policy instruments, as its 
successful policy has so far. The long-term response is to reorient Ukrainian trade, energy, 
and financial flows westward, and to encourage political reform — but in the short-term, such 
steps are difficult. The most important immediate Western policies to help secure Ukraine’s 
economic and political stability include economic assistance (without which the country 
would have collapsed long ago); trade agreements; economic sanctions on Russia; diplo-
matic pressure through the Minsk process; and a diversification of European energy sources. 
By contrast to such policies, NATO reassurance of allies such as Poland or Estonia remains 
secondary. 
Third, the “indispensable” power in this effort remains Europe. Europe will continue to 
have the most intense interests, possess greater civilian power resources, and play the central 
diplomatic role — and it has, by far, paid the greatest costs to sustain the West’s support for 
Ukraine. This suggests that the West should acknowledge, encourage, and accommodate 
Europe’s unity, resolve, and leadership role in this area. 
http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/lessons-ukraine-why-europe-led-geo-
economic-strategy-succeeding
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Germany’s Russia Policy: From Sanctions to Nord Stream 2?  
Hannes Adomeit (Bosch Fellow)
Until the fall of 2015, the German government under the leadership of Chancellor Angela Merkel, the three parties of her governing coalition, an overwhelming majority of the foreign policy community in Berlin, and German public opinion appeared to be solidly 
behind a firm approach toward Russia. German industry and commerce had largely appeared 
to have accepted the primacy of politics over economics and supported the policy of sanctions 
against Russia. 
Since then, several developments have converged that give the impression of declining resolve 
and increasing restiveness in Germany about the sanctions regime. These include the lull 
in fighting in eastern Ukraine, the huge influx of refugees into Germany, rising impatience 
about the persistence of corruption and the slow pace of reform in Ukraine, and the perceived 
necessity of persuading Russia, like in the case of Iran and its nuclear program, to help find a 
“political solution” to the war in Syria and the fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State 
group. 
Visiting President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in October 2015, Vice-Chancellor Sigmar 
Gabriel made a case not only for the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline per se 
but also for using it as a lever to improve German-Russian relations. Merkel has defended the 
pipeline as a “commercial project.” However, this should not be seen as a broad capitulation to 
pressures from German industry and commerce. The primacy of politics in German foreign 
policy is still in place. 
Merkel’s position on Nord Stream 2 notwithstanding, it is highly unlikely that German 
government policy will soon return to its pre-2014 approach to Russia. This is also true for 
Gabriel’s Social Democratic Party (SPD). The SPD no longer talks about building personal and 
economic exchanges as a means to supporting a middle class that would promote democratic 
change in Russia; the contradictions between the theory and reality of Russia’s development 
are too evident to be ignored. A significant improvement in German-Russian relations would 
depend on Russian implementation of the Minsk II agreement and a significant change in 
Russian domestic politics. 
There is a wide-spread recognition that the authoritarian system that has emerged in Russia 
is controlled by a revisionist leader who is more unpredictable than the status-quo-oriented 
collective Soviet leadership under Leonid Brezhnev. Germany political leaders and public 
opinion, however, are deeply divided on the question of what needs to be done. Merkel’s firm 
stance is increasingly challenged, and if the EU and the United States want Berlin to hold a 
strong line toward Russia, policies designed to buttress Merkel’s position domestically and 
internationally are important. 
http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/germany%E2%80%99s-russia-policy- 
sanctions-nord-stream-2
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The In-Betweeners: The Eastern Partnership Countries and the Russia-West Conflict  
Nelli Babayan
In the Russia-West conflict, it is not all about Russia. Policymakers and analysts often focus on Russian President Vladimir Putin, trying to anticipate his next move. As a result, it becomes easy to miss the unlikely winners and drivers of this confrontation. The domestic 
politics of the states in-between the European Union and Russia are a key driver, and one big 
winner, at least in the short term, is illiberalism. 
It is not simply EU incentives or Russian pressure that influences the foreign policy orienta-
tion of these countries, but also their often less-than-democratic political and often corrupt 
economic elite constellations. This is seen in the countries of the Eastern Partnership, 
which have been at the core of Russia-West conflict: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine.
Domestic elites can downplay their undemocratic practices by capitalizing on the ongoing 
rivalry between Russia and the West — note the case of the lifting of Western sanctions on 
Belarus in February 2016 despite Minsk’s lack of progress on democracy and human rights. 
The bargaining power of some Eastern Partnership countries vis-à-vis the West seems to have 
increased, although their compliance with the rules and norms promoted by the West have not 
meaningfully changed or have in some cases even decreased. 
Russia considers these countries within its core foreign policy interests, thus Western Russia 
strategy needs to involve a clear and coherent approach toward the Eastern Partnership coun-
tries. If the transatlantic partners want to achieve specific reforms in these countries, they need 
to provide commitments backed up by credibility, consistency, and (smart) conditionality, as 
well as continuous and clear communication. Western support to Eastern Partnership coun-
tries should continue, and even be in enhanced in return for tangible political and economic 
reforms. However, conditionality should be differentiated and adapted to local conditions. The 
West should pursue further economic investment and closer security cooperation by providing 
technical assistance and expertise, especially in border control when necessary. At the same 
time, the West should more actively engage in negotiations over resolution of so-called frozen 
conflicts as they tend to dangerously heat up and threaten European security. Clear communi-
cation of the West’s policies and principles, and the benefits of these for local communities, is 
important in an environment where there is significant support for the EU, but local media is 
constrained and Kremlin-controlled channels have wide reach.
http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/betweeners-eastern-partnership-countries-
and-russia-west-conflict
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Why Russia’s Economic Leverage is Declining  
Chris Miller
Despite the Kremlin’s desire to reassert influence over its neighbors, Russia’s economic leverage in Eastern Europe is declining. After over a decade of using trade and energy cutoffs to pressure its neighbors to accept its political aims, the Kremlin’s tools of 
economic coercion are losing their effectiveness. 
On the energy front, two factors are limiting Russia’s ability to use gas as a political bargaining 
chip. First, the decline in oil prices and the global glut in natural gas production have caused 
energy prices to fall across Europe. This weakens the appeal of Russian offers of cheaper gas 
in exchange for political concessions. Second, Russian threats to cut gas supply to countries 
such as Ukraine are far less credible today. Better EU regulation combined with new energy 
infrastructure, such as interconnectors and liquefied natural gas facilities, are pushing Europe 
toward a more liquid and transparent gas market. These changes have reduced the role politics 
plays in Europe’s energy sector, guaranteeing that Russia will remain a gas supplier, which 
Europe needs, but limiting the Kremlin’s ability to subvert market rules.
In the trade of non-energy goods, too, Russia’s ability to use threats of sanctions and boycotts 
against neighbors is declining. In the past, Russia imposed sanctions on countries such as 
Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova when they deviated from the Kremlin’s foreign policy line. 
Many such aggressive trade policies are still in place, but their efficacy in achieving their 
political goals has declined over time, and is likely to continue to do so. One reason is that 
non-Russian markets — not only the European Union, but also the Middle East and China — 
are becoming more important trading partners. A second reason is that producers in vulner-
able Eastern European countries have learned to diversify away from reliance on Russian 
customers. The net effect is that Russia is now far less able to use trade sanctions to coerce its 
neighbors, because its importance as an export market continues to decline.
The deterioration of Russia’s economic leverage is particularly important for the contested 
countries between the EU and Russia, notably Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. These coun-
tries are less at risk to Russian economic pressure today than a decade ago. Continuing to aid 
them in diversifying their energy supply and trade partners will help limit further the Krem-
lin’s ability to meddle in its neighbors’ affairs using tools of economic coercion.
http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/why-russia%E2%80%99s-economic-leverage-
declining
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Can Russian Elites Sustain Vladimir Putin’s Confrontational Foreign Policy?  
Marie Mendras
Russian elites are worried. The economic recession, Western sanctions, and semi-isola-tion of the past two years are endangering the personal and professional interests of most among the upper middle classes, scientific and cultural elites, top-ranking admin-
istration, and small and medium entrepreneurs. The new confrontational course in relations 
with Western countries undermines the Putin leadership’s “contract” with elites and middle 
class: enrich yourselves and leave the rest to us. The good years are over. Even a rise in oil 
prices will not ensure return to steady growth and higher salaries anytime soon. 
Do new uncertainties have an impact on elites’ submission to the regime? Most of them 
remain loyal so far, but do not trust Putin’s confrontational strategy. They have much to lose 
from further aggravation of the domestic situation, together with estrangement from the 
Western economies. Temporary exile is another response; the magnitude of the elites settled 
in Western countries and in Ukraine should preoccupy the regime. Political protest and 
economic resistance may gain momentum inside Russia.
The hyper-nationalist propaganda creates fear, xenophobia, and populist retrenchment in a 
large section of the public, but hysteria may be short-lived. People’s emotions are volatile. Also, 
Russia is a diverse and uneven country, struggling with social inequalities and insecurity in 
the North Caucasus. High ratings for Putin in opinion polls are abundantly publicized to veil 
rising anxiety in upper echelons of society.
Elites beyond Putin’s inner circle are excluded from the decision-making. They cannot express 
their opinions publicly about armed engagement in Ukraine and Syria, nor are they consulted 
about political legislation or economic choices. Who actually makes policy? Who implements 
decisions, with what means? Is anyone held accountable for failed implementation? Power 
rests in the inner circle and the siloviki. Regional governors, heads of ministries and adminis-
tration, and military high command do not have a say, or only marginally. Conflicts between 
the various siloviki/oligarchic groups may become more acute and disruptive.
In struggling against the new odds, the Russian leadership is using three major instruments: 
foreign policy adventurism and nationalist propaganda; economic emergency plans, with 
prioritization of investment and spending in the immediately lucrative sectors of hydrocar-
bons, the arms industry, and agro-business; and semi-autarchy, served by repression, corrup-
tion, and intense media and Internet control.
Foreign policy as a distraction from domestic stagnation is a dangerous tactic; so is domestic 
retrenchment that alienates the most dynamic, innovative, and productive elements of elites 
and society. Western governments will continue to negotiate with the current leadership, but 
should also engage with alternative elites.
Link forthcoming
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